

**Centre for
Climate Change
Economics and Policy**

**The Munich Re Programme: *Evaluating the Economics
of Climate Risks and Opportunities in the Insurance Sector***

www.cccep.ac.uk

Using Economic Models and Coping with their Uncertainties

Geoffrey Heal



**Münchener Rück
Munich Re Group**



**THE LONDON SCHOOL
OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE**



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS


Categories of model

- Integrated assessment models
- Theoretical models
- Econometric models

What is an IAM?

- ❑ Climate Loop
 - ❑ Emissions – concentration – temperature – economic costs as loss of output
- ❑ Economic Loop
 - ❑ Inputs [labor, capital] - emissions, output – investment, consumption
- ❑ Economic consequences appear as loss of output, never directly as impact on welfare.

Typical IAM



How do we use models?

- ❑ How do we use and construct models?
- ❑ We have forecasting models – econometric models with statistical validation –
- ❑ and theoretical models designed to generate insights into how complex systems fit together and how their components interact.

Econometric models

- ❑ Forecasting/Econometric – models of oil market, commodity markets, macroeconomy, Statistically complex.
 - ❑ Track record of forecasting models is poor.
- ❑ Econometrics probably better used for testing hypotheses than for forecasting –
 - ❑ e.g. do pollution taxes cause firms to migrate? Does outsourcing reduce wages?

Theoretical models for insights

- ❑ Theoretical models –
 - ❑ Solow 1956 growth model, Ramsey model, general equilibrium models of Arrow and Debreu,
- ❑ Solow: $Y = a(t)F(K, L), \frac{dK}{dt} = I, C + I = Y, \frac{dL}{dt} = n$
- ❑ Dasgupta/Heal maximize $\int_0^{\infty} u(c)e^{-\delta t} dt$
- ❑
- ❑ subject to $c + I = F(K, L, R), I = \frac{dK}{dt}, \int_0^{\infty} R \leq S_0$
- ❑ Provide basis for Nordhaus's DICE model

Theoretical models for insights

- ❑ Forecasting and hypothesis testing are irrelevant: issue is to get **robust qualitative** insights into the behavior of the economy.
 - ❑ EG how does the rate of technical progress affect the economy's long-run growth?
 - ❑ How does resource scarcity affect growth in the long run? Is growth sustainable in the face of resource scarcity?
 - ❑ Robust means not sensitive to small changes in specification
- ❑ Big qualitative questions. Models are good if they capture important interactions and if conclusions are robust to specification changes, so we need to study the sensitivity of the model in a topological not a numerical sense.

Back to IAMs

- ❑ Where do they fit in this typology?
- ❑ Based on theoretical models for insights – but often claiming some numerical precision
- ❑ No econometric component – calibrated rather than estimated
- ❑ Probably means that numerical estimates are suspect and that we should pay attention to qualitative rather than quantitative features

Back to IAMs

- ❑ When they say “Costs of climate change are 1% or 14% of GDP” what are they saying?
- ❑ My interpretation is that they are saying “negligible” or “significant” but no more than this.
- ❑ The difference between 10% and 20% is not significant, though the difference between 1% and 20% probably is.
- ❑ In other words, only very robust features of outputs merit confidence.
- ❑ Lots of sensitivity analysis is crucial
- ❑ I have more confidence in simple calculations than in some of these complex models – e.g. cost of reducing CO₂ emissions 80% = CO₂ output * 0.8 * \$40

Back to IAMs

- ❑ Miss the non-market effects of CC, which according to many scientists may be the most important.
- ❑ Also don't model direct welfare impacts of climate change and changes in biosphere
- ❑ Arguably temperature, concentration should affect welfare directly because of impacts on B/D, fisheries, natural capital or ecosystem services.
- ❑ How does state of environment affect human welfare? Is there a minimum of ESS required for any level of wellbeing?
- ❑ Status of IAMs highly unsatisfactory on all these counts.

Uncertainty

- ❑ Normal approach – take a PDF over space of possible outcomes and work with EV and with moments as measure of risk
- ❑ Don't have a PDF
 - ❑ Could work with subjective probabilities and be Bayesian (Weitzman, Pindyck).
 - ❑ Or could drop idea of a PDF altogether and work with non-expected utility frameworks, e.g. Henry.

Subjective probabilities

- ❑ Over both climate science and socio-economic impacts we don't have a PDF based on observation or on knowledge of data generation process
- ❑ Can instead elicit subjective PDFs from experts, which is roughly what IPCC does today
- ❑ Revise according to Bayesian updating as more data becomes available – Weitzman, Pindyck
- ❑ As good or bad as the subjective estimates of the experts, many of whom are not trained to think probabilistically

Non-EU approaches

- ❑ Alternative – recognize we don't have PDFs over outcomes but do nevertheless have some information about the relative likelihoods of different regions of outcome space
- ❑ Not complete enough or integrated enough to give PDF – probabilistic information even when we don't have a PDF
- ❑ Several approaches – most common, work with all PDFs consistent with the data available
- ❑ One axiom set says we look for such PDFs that give best and worst outcomes and evaluate with a weighted average – almost a scenario-based approach – Henry
- ❑ Leads to precautionary behavior, precautionary principle

Fat tails

- ❑ IPCC focuses on most likely range of outcomes – 2-4 deg.
- ❑ But greatest damage is in extreme outcomes in tails of distribution – 6 deg temperature rise
- ❑ These are low but not zero probability and the losses may be so massive that even with low probabilities these outcomes should dominate our calculations
- ❑ Point recently emphasized by Weitzman, who suggests that with subjective probabilities and Bayesian updating and a non-informative prior over climate sensitivity then tail outcomes should dominate our thinking about the economic costs of climate change
- ❑ Non-EU approach also suggests extreme caution in such cases

The end

Questions?

